Less is not more
by Gary J. Schmitt
With NATO’s shrinking military capabilities and the reduced US military presence in Europe, the alliance’s attempts to deter Russia from destabilizing NATO’s eastern front have been less than impressive.
Since the 1990s, the United States has been drawing down its forces in Europe under the assessment that the security situation on the Continent was largely and increasingly benign. Indeed, after the Balkan conflict, from an operational point of view, much of the military infrastructure, force structure, and alliance effort was increasingly in support of non-European military conflicts and operations in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa.
The US strategic focus shifted to giving primacy to Asia in January 2012 with the issuance of the Defense Strategic Guidance. This “pivot” or “rebalancing” was justified, in part, on the grounds that Europe was now a security provider, not a security problem.
As explained in the Guidance and statements made by senior administration and military officials, the drawdown was also generated by the assessment that the US military could no longer sustain a “two-war” capability given declining defense budgets and had to rationalize its strategic posture to reflect that reduced capability.
Both Beijing and Moscow have clearly been more ambitious in pursuing new, regional security paradigms designed, they believe, to enhance their national interests and reverse strategic ‘losses’ from decades past.
Both US political parties have reinforced the reduced global strategic posture in order to address pressing domestic issues. Obama administration officials, in particular, believed that rebalancing would require not only winding down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but also building new relationships with potential state competitors such as China and Russia. Hence, the priority the administration gave in its early days to the “reset” with Moscow and enhanced engagement with Beijing.
Whatever the benefits associated with these two efforts, it cannot be said that either engagement has produced a significant change in the strategic outlook of those two governments. To the contrary, both Beijing and Moscow have clearly been more ambitious in pursuing new, regional security paradigms designed, they believe, to enhance their national interests and reverse strategic “losses” from decades past. The most egregious example is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and its continuing efforts to carve out Novorossiya from eastern Ukraine.
NATO’s inadequate response
by Gary J. Schmitt
With NATO’s shrinking military capabilities and the reduced US military presence in Europe, the alliance’s attempts to deter Russia from destabilizing NATO’s eastern front have been less than impressive.
Since the 1990s, the United States has been drawing down its forces in Europe under the assessment that the security situation on the Continent was largely and increasingly benign. Indeed, after the Balkan conflict, from an operational point of view, much of the military infrastructure, force structure, and alliance effort was increasingly in support of non-European military conflicts and operations in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa.
The US strategic focus shifted to giving primacy to Asia in January 2012 with the issuance of the Defense Strategic Guidance. This “pivot” or “rebalancing” was justified, in part, on the grounds that Europe was now a security provider, not a security problem.
As explained in the Guidance and statements made by senior administration and military officials, the drawdown was also generated by the assessment that the US military could no longer sustain a “two-war” capability given declining defense budgets and had to rationalize its strategic posture to reflect that reduced capability.
Both Beijing and Moscow have clearly been more ambitious in pursuing new, regional security paradigms designed, they believe, to enhance their national interests and reverse strategic ‘losses’ from decades past.
Both US political parties have reinforced the reduced global strategic posture in order to address pressing domestic issues. Obama administration officials, in particular, believed that rebalancing would require not only winding down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but also building new relationships with potential state competitors such as China and Russia. Hence, the priority the administration gave in its early days to the “reset” with Moscow and enhanced engagement with Beijing.
Whatever the benefits associated with these two efforts, it cannot be said that either engagement has produced a significant change in the strategic outlook of those two governments. To the contrary, both Beijing and Moscow have clearly been more ambitious in pursuing new, regional security paradigms designed, they believe, to enhance their national interests and reverse strategic “losses” from decades past. The most egregious example is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and its continuing efforts to carve out Novorossiya from eastern Ukraine.
NATO’s inadequate response
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