miércoles, 22 de marzo de 2017

Así se inoculó durante años en los hogares la ideología de género: lo que ahora son leyes e imposiciones antes fueron contenidos televisivos

Series, presentadores, realities: así se inoculó durante años en los hogares la ideología de género

El lobby LGTB lleva años trabajando en el mundo del entretenimiento y los medios. 
En España todas las cadenas sucumben al lobby LGTB


Para entender la situación actual en la que la ideología de género campa a sus anchas en España hay que remontarse años atrás. Lo que ahora son leyes e imposiciones antes fueron contenidos televisivos. Desde hace más de quince años, el lobby LGTB ha ido copando los contenidos televisivos y ahora casi lo dominan todo logrando así normalizar y preparar el camino a esta ideología.

Series, películas, realities shows, presentadores...Su presencia ha sido abrumadora estos años, lo que ha ido anestesiando a la sociedad española, que ya ve familiar todo lo relacionado con el LGTB. Sonia Robledo ha analizado en Actuall todo este proceso hasta llegar a lo que vive España hoy:

Todo empezó en 2003, con “Aquí no hay quien viva” (Antena 3), serie pionera en introducir personajes LGTBI en la pequeña pantalla. Y ha llegado hasta “First Dates” (Mediaset)… de momento.

El productor de “Aquí no hay quien viva”, José Luis Moreno, introduce con las manos abiertas a Mauri, un vecino gay del edificio del de tres plantas, una portería antigua y un local donde se desarrolla la serie. A día de hoy, su predecesora, “La que se avecina”, ha heredado la representación LGTBI en esta comunidad de vecinos.

Ya teníamos el universo LGTB en una escalera, como la de Buero Vallejo. Nada más cotidiano, cercano al espectador y hasta entrañable. Ponga un gay en su casa, aunque sea, de momento la comunidad de vecinos.

Los personajes LGTB lo han copado casi todo
Después los personajes o contenidos LGTB lo han copado casi todo: series, realities, sit-com, tertulias y por supuesto la publicidad. La pequeña pantalla ha hecho que estén en todas partes, adquiriendo así un estatus de visibilidad incontestable. Y por lo tanto de normalidad.

¿Es casual que “Aquí no hay quien viva” se inicie sólo un año antes de que el PSOE de Zapatero incluya en su programa electoral el matrimonio homosexual?

¿Es casual que la serie se inicie en 2003, sólo un año antes de que el PSOE de Zapatero incluya en su programa electoral el matrimonio homosexual? Y en cuanto llegó al poder, una de las primeras medidas de su Gobierno fue aprobarlo (2005).

Once Venice's government was comprised of people who knew how to make money and create jobs, there was a dramatic increase in financial and legal innovation.

The Medieval Geniuses Who Invented Carried Interest and the Modern Barbarians Who Want to Tax It

by Drew Armstrong

IIt’s no secret that both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton fail to understand that taxation is theft. Neither was even willing to retain the few laudable provisions that exist in the tax code. Instead, they used class warfare to condemn what is commonly referred to as “carried interest.”

Carried interest allows the investment manager of a fund or partnership to be compensated with the profits of the funds. The proceeds are taxed as capital gains rather than income.

Despite the heated rhetoric, the provision of law is based on a historical parallel that dates back to the Middle Ages. A look back into history shows how carried interest was created and why it is a vital component of a thriving society.

Merchants Fuel Long-Distance Trade

Think back to Venice, Italy in the year 1036. Due to the geographic location and numerous beneficial alliances, Venice began to grow wealthy as an international center of trade. Up to that point, the Venetian head of state, or Doge, had absolute power and was always selected from one of the three wealthiest families. But as the wealthy merchant class grew, so did their power, and by 1036 the first merchant was elected as Doge.

As the wealthy merchant class gained power, Venice’s trade greatly expanded, creating enormous opportunity for its citizens. 


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Another collective apology is being demanded of us. This time for making India poor.

Is the Empire really to blame for impoverishing India?

By Tim Worstall

  • There are things we should apologise for, but making India poorer isn't one of them
  • The Licence Raj was an attempt to grow the Indian economy using Fabian Socialist tactics
  • India's economy tripled during the Raj - but so too did its population

Another collective apology is being demanded of us. This time for making India poor. That’s the message from Shashi Tharoor, whose new book, Inglorious Empire, is calling for reparations. He claims we invaded, added the sub-Continent to the Empire, impoverished the place and the people.

There is only one slight problem with this analysis – which is that the Indian economy tripled in size between Clive slashing his way through the Maharajahs and Partition. You can call me a detail-obsessed fuddy duddy if you like but that’s not leaving a place poorer.

While there are most certainly things we should and could apologise for – Matt Ridley details some of the horrors in The Times as does David Olusoga over in The Guardian – making India poorer isn’t one of them.

We can point to unfair trade terms for cotton or locomotives, we can even point out that the average living standard of an inhabitant didn’t increase very much over those centuries. But the place didn’t become poorer.

The standard measurements of historical living standards come from Angus Maddison. If you’ve haven’t done so, it’s most informative to download that spreadsheet and have a look. While these numbers aren’t accurate to the last cent, it’s generally accepted that they’re a pretty good guide. The measurement is in US$ of 1992 vintage, adjusted for price differences across time and geography in order for us to be able to compare living standards not cash income before inflation or anything


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In its ancient and scholastic form, indeed, the subject of Logic stands almost exclusively associated with the great name of Aristotle

How Aristotle Created the Computer

by Chris Dixon

The philosophers he influenced set the stage for the technological revolution that remade our world.

The history of computers is often told as a history of objects, from the abacus to the Babbage engine up through the code-breaking machines of World War II. In fact, it is better understood as a history of ideas, mainly ideas that emerged from mathematical logic, an obscure and cult-like discipline that first developed in the 19th century. Mathematical logic was pioneered by philosopher-mathematicians, most notably George Boole and Gottlob Frege, who were themselves inspired by Leibniz’s dream of a universal “concept language,” and the ancient logical system of Aristotle.

Mathematical logic was initially considered a hopelessly abstract subject with no conceivable applications. As one computer scientist commented: “If, in 1901, a talented and sympathetic outsider had been called upon to survey the sciences and name the branch which would be least fruitful in [the] century ahead, his choice might well have settled upon mathematical logic.” And yet, it would provide the foundation for a field that would have more impact on the modern world than any other.


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Paris, 10e Pèlerinage du Monde des Médias, le 22 avril

Capture d’écran 2017-03-18 à 17.49.48

domingo, 19 de marzo de 2017

What does natural law say about the power of judges in constitutional systems of government?

Neil Gorsuch, Natural Law, and the Limits of Judicial Power

by Samuel Gregg

When President Donald Trump announced his first nominee to the Supreme Court, many observers quickly noted that Neil Gorsuch wrote his doctoral thesis under the supervision of the Oxford legal philosopher John Finnis. Some immediately asked whether Gorsuch’s approach to constitutional interpretation might be shaped by the “New Natural Law Theory” (NNLT) pioneered by Finnis and others.

The columnist George Will, for instance, expressed the hope that Gorsuch might “effect a philosophic correction” to what Will regards as a lacuna in Justice Antonin Scalia’s theory of originalism. In his 1997 book A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Scalia wrote, “there is no such philosophizing in our Constitution, which, unlike the Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, is a practical and pragmatic charter of government.”

Will takes a different view. Natural rights, he claimed, may be “independent of the Constitution” insofar as they “are grounded in [human] nature.” But natural rights are also, Will stated, what the Constitution exists to protect. Will concluded by suggesting that the fact the Gorsuch studied under the author ofNatural Law and Natural Rights (1980)—the book which some believe single-handedly revitalized natural law theory in jurisprudence and philosophy more generally—might foreshadow more attention to natural rights in Supreme Court deliberations.

No one can predict with certainty Gorsuch’s take on any question on which he might be called to deliberate if he receives Senate confirmation. But before too much ink is spilled speculating on whether natural law in general or NNLT in particular will influence Gorsuch’s thought, it is worth reflecting on two important prior questions. How does natural law theory view constitutionalism? And what does this mean for the exercise of judicial power?
Power Maps or Normative Ends?

Answering such questions requires clarification of the purpose of constitutions. Constitutions are usually regarded as
(1) the written documents that outline the powers of different political institutions as well as 

(2) the legal rules, customs, and conventions that define the system and workings of government.

But in his 1998 book An Introduction to Constitutional Law (published in the same series as Natural Law and Natural Rights), Eric Barendt notes that constitutions are more than a type of power map. For if this were the sole purpose of constitutions, it would be possible for a tyrannical regime to comply formally with constitutional law while carrying out fundamentally unjust policies.

In other words, constitutions have purposes that go beyond saying who may do what. In the American Constitution’s case, one such goal is to limit the exercise of political authority. At the time of its drafting, a major focus was on limiting the powers of the states. But the Constitution also seeks to establish barriers to despotism through dividing power, establishing checks and balances, and specifying protections for particular liberties, especially through the Bill of Rights.

At no point, however, does the Constitution guarantee the realization of happiness by any Americans. Instead it helps to promote what NNLT describes as an instrumental common good rather than a common good that is an all-encompassing end in itself. This instrumental common good concerns particular conditions that must prevail in a community if people are to flourish. When the rule of law, for example, is absent from a community, it becomes much more difficult for all individuals and associations in that community to pursue their legitimate ends.

The Political Common Good and Limited Government

How then does NNLT view the relationship between this instrumental common good and the state? In a succinct introduction to NNLT, Christopher Tollefsenexplains that the three primary NNLT thinkers—Finnis, Germain Grisez, and the late Joseph Boyle—“converged on an account of political authority and the common good” over time.

In the first place they rejected, as Finnis writes, the view that “government should command whatever leads people towards their ultimate (heavenly) end, forbid whatever deflects them from it, and coercively deter people from evil-doing and induce them to morally decent conduct.” Rather, NNLT holds that government serves “the political common good.”

This political common good, Finnis explains, consists of “the whole ensemble of material and other conditions, including forms of collaboration, that tend to favor, facilitate, and foster the realization by each individual [in that community] of his or her personal development.” Here “personal development” is shorthand for integral human flourishing: the free choice of, and coherent participation in, basic goods like truth, work, and beauty, which are self-evidently good for all humans.

The conditions that might facilitate everyone’s ability to make free choices for such goods are extensive. They range from protecting the community from external aggression to deterring and punishing community members who act in what Tollefsen calls a predatory manner.

But NNLT also specifies that the carrying out of these responsibilities should never involve government taking over the proper responsibilities of natural societies (such as families or religious associations) and only exceptionally calls for the state taking over the responsibilities of instrumental associations (such as businesses). Assisting individuals and associations in a given political community means precisely that: helping. The state does not assist people by usurping or annulling their ability to make the free choices that actualize human flourishing.

More could be said about NNLT’s view of how the state seeks to realize the political common good. The most recent iteration may be found in Finnis’s response to Leslie Green’s critique of his conception of limited government in the same collection of essays in which Judge Gorsuch published a paper entitled “Intention and the Allocation of Risk.” For our purposes, however, what matters is that NNLT’s understanding of the political common good underscores the necessity of limited and therefore constitutional government.

Designing Constitutions and Configuring Judicial Power

This leaves unanswered the question of what natural law theory says abouthow we limit the state’s powers. As Robert P. George writes, natural law theory holds that positive law, including constitutional law, is always derived in some way from the natural law. Sometimes this is relatively direct: the wrongness of murder, for instance, translates quickly into the laws that prohibit and punish murder.

But to an extent perhaps greater than other natural law theories, NNLT has stressed Thomas Aquinas’s point that the derivation is not always so direct. We cannot, for instance, determine the one unique constitutional arrangement that 

(1) successfully restricts the scope of government action by dividing executive, judicial, and legislative powers and 

(2) gives effect to those fundamental protections we call rights.

Instead, constitutional design occurs by way of what Aquinas called in hisSumma Theologiae “determination [determinatio] of certain generalities.” The constitutions of the United States, France, and Australia all involve, for instance, the separation of powers. But they do not realize this goal in exactly the same way. Each, however, is a reasonable way of realizing the same end.
A similar point can be made about the scope of judicial review accorded by a constitution to judges. Take the case of a constitution being developed in a community in which natural law and natural rights are self-evident to those drafting and ratifying the constitution. Let’s also assume that the drafters expect the community’s political life to continue to reflect a commitment to natural rights and natural law.

Yet even when devising constitutional arrangements in such a context, the drafters cannot directly decide on the basis of the natural law itself the extent to which, for example, judges may review legislation from the standpoint of natural rights. This is very much a question of determinatio.

The constitution’s designers may determine that the legislature rather than the judiciary should have the primary responsibility for assuring that laws do not violate the logic and morality of natural law or the freedoms embodied in natural rights. This would mean that judges who presumed to take such a primary role upon themselves, rather than confining themselves to acting according to the constitution’s intent and text, would be acting in a lawless manner.

This would still be the case if the cause—such as protecting innocent life—were good. George reminds us that all public officials in a reasonably just regime have “a duty in justice to respect the constitutional limits of their own authority,” not least because respect for the rule of law (which includes respecting a community’s just determinatio of constitutional order) is itself a requirement of natural law.

What might all this mean for a Justice Neil Gorsuch? If NNLT has exercised some influence over his thought, those who desire greater attention being given to natural rights in Supreme Court deliberations shouldn’t assume that Gorsuch believes a robust concern for natural law permits him to go beyond what the Constitution’s intent and text allow Supreme Court justices to do.

On the contrary, it points to a justice who would operate strictly within the boundaries of that great determinatio adopted by the Founders in 1787, ratified by the states in 1788, and modified by subsequent amendments. Certainly, that still leaves scope for a justice who wants to protect those natural rights that he believes are to be found in the Constitution. But it would occur in a way consistent with the Constitution’s commitment to limiting state power—including that of the judiciary—and a natural law understanding of constitutional design.

Samuel Gregg is Research Director at the Acton Institute.

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Canadian Catholics are mourning the loss of one of the local Church’s most ardent defenders of life

Msgr. Vincent Foy: the 101-year-old priest who refused to be silent about betrayals in the Church

by Lianne Laurence

TORONTO, March 14, 2017 (LifeSiteNews) — Canadian Catholics are mourning the loss of one of the local Church’s most ardent defenders of life. Monsignor Vincent Foy, who died March 13 from natural causes at age 101, is remembered especially for his decades-long battle to promote the Church’s authentic teaching on procreation.

A canon lawyer and priest of the Archdiocese of Toronto for 78 years, Msgr. Foy was “an inveterate defender of the sacredness of all human life, especially that of unborn babies,” said Basilian Father Alphonse de Valk, former editor of The Interim and founding editor of Catholic Insight Magazine.

“His greatest and most courageous contribution to Canada’s pro-life cause came when he decided that he could no longer be silent about the betrayal by a large majority of Canada’s bishops” of the Church’s teaching on contraception, Fr. de Valk told LifeSiteNews.

That betrayal came in the form of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops’ 1968 Winnipeg Statement, released two months after Pope Paul VI publishedHumanae Vitae in July 1968, which reaffirmed Catholic teaching that contraception is intrinsically evil.

In the Winnipeg Statement, the bishops “contradicted and opposed” Humanae Vitae, “virtually nullifying the encyclical in large part in North America and elsewhere,” said Fr. de Valk.

The “bishops fell into the trap of moral relativism,” Msgr. Foy wrote in Tragedy at Winnipeg, his major critique of the document first published in Challenge Magazine in 1988.

It gives a play-by-play account of the lead-up to and fall out from the Statement’s publication on September 27, 1968, which Foy described as “the saddest day in the history of the Catholic Church in Canada.”

The Statement’s Paragraph 26 tells Catholics if they sincerely try but cannot follow Church teaching in this matter, “whoever chooses that course which seems right to him does so in good conscience.”

Msgr. Foy was unflagging in his opposition to the Winnipeg Statement, even though “he often seemed like a lone voice” speaking out against it, “with many Canadian Catholics welcoming the document,” noted a 2014 LifeSiteNews article.

“Despite advice that he was wasting his time, reprint after reprint appeared, article after article continued to savage contraception,” de Valk told LifeSiteNews.

‘A hero in every sense of the word’

“Monsignor Foy was a hero in every sense of the word,” noted John-Henry Westen, co-founder and editor-in-chief of LifeSiteNews.

“He battled on the most difficult field, against his own confreres in the hierarchy who refused to remain true to the teaching of the Church on the intrinsic evil of contraception.”

“Through his writings and clarity he likely saved countless souls,” added Westen.

“Not only of those Catholics who would otherwise have been led astray into a false vision of their warped consciences as supreme arbiter, but also the souls of clergy who would otherwise have misled many of the faithful resulting in their own damnation.”

“He was solid as a rock,” echoed Jim Hughes, president of Campaign Life Coalition, who knew Msgr. Foy for 50 years.