Civility is due not to a person’s opinions, but to the person himself.

Who Deserves Respect?

by Carson Holloway

Last week, there was an interesting, instructive, and troubling exchange between Public Discourse’s Ryan Anderson and the New York Times’s Josh Barro. The initial topic was the definition of marriage, with Anderson defending the traditional and natural view that it is a union between a man and a woman. As is all too common for our friends on the left, Barro responded by resorting not to argument but to denunciation, claiming that some people are “unworthy of respect.”

Then it got more interesting. In response to Anderson’s call for a respectful dialogue about this issue, Barro held that “some people are deserving of incivility.” He asserted that Anderson and similar defenders of the traditional conception of marriage don’t deserve to be treated with respect because they are, in his words, “anti-gay.” Indeed, Barro defended his position as common sense: surely anyone would agree that a segregationist—his example—does not deserve to be treated with respect. What we have, then, according to Barro, is a disagreement not over whether everyone deserves respect, but over where to draw the line between who does and who does not deserve respect.

Barro’s position deserves careful examination, because it represents what many liberals secretly think, even though they will not say it as openly as Barro was willing to do.

Where Do We Draw the Line?

Before examining Barro’s position, however, it is fair to make clear what he is and is not saying. By denying that some people deserve respect, he is not saying that they have no rights at all. He is saying, rather, that they have no claim to be treated with civility, but instead deserve to be spoken to and about with whatever denunciatory language that their betters think fit to employ.

We can begin to discern the untenability of Barros’s position by asking how he would draw the line between those who do and do not deserve respect. He would probably begin with a list of examples of those who don’t deserve respect or civility. His exchange with Anderson suggested such a response: the segregationist and the defender of slavery, he said, do not deserve respect, nor, presumably, the Nazi.

The problem with such a response is that it is not really an answer to the question how to draw the line. Examples do not constitute a definition. Is Barro willing to say that the opponents of same-sex marriage deserve to be classed with segregationists? Perhaps. But then are the opponents of polygamy also to be put in such a category, or the opponents of lowering the age of consent so that adults can marry minor children? Probably not, on Barro’s view. He therefore needs not just examples but a definition in order to draw the line that he believes must exist somewhere.

This gets us to the deeper problem: it will turn out to be impossible for Barro to draw such a line convincingly. Any principle we can conceive him bringing forward would only beg the question. He might contend that anyone who denies equality should not be treated with respect, but this just raises a question about what are the just demands of equality. Or he might say that those who deny human rights don’t deserve civility. Again, this settles nothing when we are trying to figure out what is the proper conception of human rights. He might hold that anyone who stands in the way of progress does not deserve respect, but this would merely compel us to ask what changes in law and society actually constitute improvement and so deserve to be called progress.

No matter how long we tried, our effort to find a principle here would get us no further than this conclusion: people who disagree with Josh Barro and his friends don’t deserve to be treated with respect. This is obviously a non-starter.

The untenability of Barro’s claim also becomes clear if we think through its implications in relation to conduct as well as opinion. Barro wants to say that people who hold, express, and work for views he regards as wildly wrong do not deserve to be treated with respect or civility. It would seem reasonable to assume, then, that he also thinks outright wrongdoers also do not deserve to be so treated. Is he really prepared to stand by this view?

It is ordinary practice for criminal defendants—even those charged with heinous crimes—to be accorded a certain civility. During a trial, the prosecutor and the judge will refer to such a person as “the defendant” or “the accused.” When not using such expressions they will usually refer to the person being tried as “sir” or “ma’am” or use such commonly courteous expressions are “Mr.” or “Ms.” or “Mrs.” Such respect for the person is continued, moreover, even after guilt has been established and a conviction secured. Does Barro really think it would be appropriate for government officials conducting such proceedings to dispense with such civilities, perhaps referring to criminals as “thugs,” “scum,” or “garbage”? If not, then can he explain why those who hold views he rejects deserve less respect?

...........

Read more: www.thepublicdiscourse.com