The Surrealism of Realism:
Misreading the War in Ukraine
by Alexander J. Motyl
Most general readers following events in Ukraine may not be aware that much of the debate and many of the policy prescriptions among “experts” have been dominated by a school of thought in international relations scholarship known as “realism.” In a nutshell, realists have argued that US policy toward the Russo-Ukrainian conflict should be driven by pragmatic American interests and by the realities of Russia’s regional great-power status—two propositions few would disagree with. Realist arguments become more controversial, however, when they go on to insist that Russia’s behavior toward Ukraine is actually a reasonable response to Western attempts to wrest Ukraine from Russia’s sphere of influence and that the culprit behind the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war is, thus, the West in general and the United States and NATO in particular.
Realists can be found on the right (Henry Kissinger and Nikolas K. Gvosdev), on the left (Stephen F. Cohen and Michel Chossudovsky), and in the center (John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt). At first glance, it may be most surprising that leftists should have embraced a Realpolitik view of the world. But only at first glance. Recall that Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and a host of other Marxist leaders were no less realist in their conduct of foreign policy than Winston Churchill and Richard Nixon. It is no surprise that many policymakers come into office with grand ideals, discover that the realities of power militate against their easy transformation into policy, come to appreciate that politics is, indeed, the “art of the possible,” and embrace realism as the worldview of the sadder but wiser.
Realism rests on the astonishingly bold claim that all states at all times always pursue their own national interests and struggle for power. Underlying this empirically unprovable tenet are several key assumptions. First, that states are rational actors. Second, that their rationality concerns maximizing material self-interest and minimizing material risk. And third, that all states share pretty much identical rationality “functions” that reasonable individuals, such as realists assume themselves to be, can easily divine and interpret. If states are irrational, or their self-interest is non-material, realism implodes. After all, the power of realism lies precisely in its claims about objective rationality and objective interests. Any concession to subjectivity (such as leaders who assess interests based on their historical memory, political culture, or ideology) opens the door to realism’s theoretical antithesis—“idealism”—and its theoretical nightmare—“constructivism,” which claims that rationalities and interests are “socially constructed” and, hence, fluid, unstable, and anything but objective. A Theory of Everything such as realism can be either right or wrong: there is no gray in between. As a result, if they concede any ground to their idealist and subjectivist competitors, realists can no longer claim possession of the intellectual Rosetta stone that explains everything all the time.
by Alexander J. Motyl
Most general readers following events in Ukraine may not be aware that much of the debate and many of the policy prescriptions among “experts” have been dominated by a school of thought in international relations scholarship known as “realism.” In a nutshell, realists have argued that US policy toward the Russo-Ukrainian conflict should be driven by pragmatic American interests and by the realities of Russia’s regional great-power status—two propositions few would disagree with. Realist arguments become more controversial, however, when they go on to insist that Russia’s behavior toward Ukraine is actually a reasonable response to Western attempts to wrest Ukraine from Russia’s sphere of influence and that the culprit behind the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war is, thus, the West in general and the United States and NATO in particular.
Realists can be found on the right (Henry Kissinger and Nikolas K. Gvosdev), on the left (Stephen F. Cohen and Michel Chossudovsky), and in the center (John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt). At first glance, it may be most surprising that leftists should have embraced a Realpolitik view of the world. But only at first glance. Recall that Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and a host of other Marxist leaders were no less realist in their conduct of foreign policy than Winston Churchill and Richard Nixon. It is no surprise that many policymakers come into office with grand ideals, discover that the realities of power militate against their easy transformation into policy, come to appreciate that politics is, indeed, the “art of the possible,” and embrace realism as the worldview of the sadder but wiser.
Realism rests on the astonishingly bold claim that all states at all times always pursue their own national interests and struggle for power. Underlying this empirically unprovable tenet are several key assumptions. First, that states are rational actors. Second, that their rationality concerns maximizing material self-interest and minimizing material risk. And third, that all states share pretty much identical rationality “functions” that reasonable individuals, such as realists assume themselves to be, can easily divine and interpret. If states are irrational, or their self-interest is non-material, realism implodes. After all, the power of realism lies precisely in its claims about objective rationality and objective interests. Any concession to subjectivity (such as leaders who assess interests based on their historical memory, political culture, or ideology) opens the door to realism’s theoretical antithesis—“idealism”—and its theoretical nightmare—“constructivism,” which claims that rationalities and interests are “socially constructed” and, hence, fluid, unstable, and anything but objective. A Theory of Everything such as realism can be either right or wrong: there is no gray in between. As a result, if they concede any ground to their idealist and subjectivist competitors, realists can no longer claim possession of the intellectual Rosetta stone that explains everything all the time.
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