Nosotros, católicos, tenemos que hablar con todos los hombres. Y por supuesto con los masones.

Un ex masón maestro grado 14º: «Las leyes contra la familia son promovidas por las logias»



por Javier Lozano / Actuall
Serge Abad-Gallardo perteneció a la masonería durante 23 años




Serge Abad-Gallardo es un francés de origen español que sabe muy bien cómo funciona la masonería. Durante más de veinte años fue miembro de una de las logias, que dejó tras convertirse al catolicismo. En su libro Por qué dejé de ser masón explica este proceso y cómo funciona esta sociedad. El precio ha sido caro para él pues poco después de su publicación fue despedido de su trabajo.

Actuall ha hablado con Serge para conocer la influencia de la masonería en las leyes sociales que se están imponiendo en todo el mundo, cuál es el verdadero poder que ostenta y quién es su principal enemigo.

-¿Qué relación tiene la masonería con las leyes de ingeniería social como el aborto, la eutanasia, el divorcio o el matrimonio homosexual? 

-Las leyes que han sido promulgadas por la Asamblea Nacional francesa han sido reflexionadas y formalizadas en las logias. En particular en la Gran Logia de Francia, Gran Oriente y Derecho Humano de Francia. De esto puedo dar testimonio porque cada año todas las logias del Derecho Humano, en la cual yo fui masón durante 23 años, trabajan en un tema social común y realizan un documento de síntesis que las logias envían a sus dirigentes nacionales. Y éstos, tras una última revisión lo transmiten al Presidente de la República.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iIhwDFZ7w_o

En Por qué dejé de ser masón, Serge Abad-Gallardo recoge su experiencia personal de 23 años en la masonería.


-¿Y tanta influencia tiene? 

-Hay un grupo importante de masones presentes en el Parlamento. Se llama “Fraternidad Parlamentaria” y está constituido de 400 masones de todas la obediencias masónicas, siendo todos ellos altos funcionarios y diputados. Son casi el 20% del Parlamento. Y todo ello sin tener en cuenta a los diputados masones que no pertenecen a este grupo. Ellos votan estas leyes sociales (aborto, matrimonio homosexual, etc.) en primer lugar como masones, sea cual que sea su partido político. Todas estas leyes sociales que son contrarias al derecho natural ya han sido elaboradas y escritas en las logias antes de ser votadas.

-Pero eso es un fraude a los ciudadanos… 

-Hay que fijarse que todo este poder masónico es antidemocrático. Los masones de Francia representan el 0,3% de la población francesa pero los masones de la Fraternidad Parlamentaria son el 20% de los diputados.

-¿Por qué apoya la masonería esta serie de leyes contra la familia? 

-La masonería es en la mayoría de las obediencias anti-catolica y anticlerical. La masonería es para ellos una religión verdadera tal y como cuento en mi libro. Sus fundamentos son totalmente diferentes y opuestos a la moral católica, que por ejemplo hace de la familia la base de la sociedad. Promoviendo leyes contra la familia intentan destruir la Iglesia Católica. Este es uno de los motivos por lo cual yo afirmo que no es posible ser católico y masón.

-¿Qué intereses hay detrás de estas maniobras políticas para cambiar la sociedad? 

-Hay varios intereses. En primer lugar la masonería quiere imponer su manera de ver y de ser. Ellos hablan de tolerancia, pero son tolerantes únicamente con las ideas que no son contrarias a la ideología masónica. Por ejemplo yo puedo testimoniar que siendo masón no se puede decir en una logia que el aborto es un crimen. En segundo lugar, la masonería está convencida de tener las llaves de la felicidad de la humanidad y que sólo ellos pueden “dar luz” a los “pobres hombres”. Por último, hay probablemente motivos económicos. El hombre que no tiene familia se vuelve un ser que el poder económico mundial puede emplear de todas las maneras y en cualquier sitio. Por eso Jacques Attali (miembro del grupo Bilderberg, y masón), consejero de varios presidentes franceses, explica en su libro L’Homme Nomade que el hecho de no tener familia es la llave del desarrollo cultural y económico, y por tanto de la felicidad.

-¿Cómo ingresó en la masonería? 

-Cuando tenía 33 años. Y salí a los 56. En aquella época empezaba una carrera de funcionario como arquitecto y director del Urbanismo de un ayuntamiento de 50.000 habitantes. Un agente inmobiliario que era amigo mío, y que era oficial en la masonería, me propuso entrar. Ingresé porque estaba buscando respuestas a las preguntas sobre la vida, el por qué de estar vivo y el sentido de la vida.

-¿Y cómo es su funcionamiento? 

-La masonería dice que funciona de manera democrática. Pero es mentira. Los masones que están en los Altos Grados lo controlan todo y las elecciones internas están previstas y arregladas por ellos. Luego, cuando todo está preparado, entonces se vota para elegir el venerable maestro y los oficiales. La masonería no es un grupo democrático, sino iniciático. Hay que saber que en cuando uno ingresa en la masonería, siempre los masones oficiales, o de Altos Grados lo van observando. Y luego ven si puede alcanzar los grados más altos.

-Entonces, ¿por qué dejó usted de ser masón? 

-Pues porque volví a la fe y a la Iglesia Católica. El Señor me concedió la gracia de que yo pudiera comprender su presencia y su amor absoluto. En 2002 me encontré un sacerdote franciscano. Hablé con él varias horas y sentí la presencia de Jesús a mi lado. Aunque creí en este momento en Dios, no volví a la Iglesia. Luego me encontré otro sacerdote en Antibes. Le dije que sentía la necesidad de rezar y de comulgar pero que había olvidado todas mis oraciones. Él me sonrió y me dijo que lo que Dios amaba más eran las oraciones con nuestras palabras, y nuestro corazón. Así hice. Mucho más tarde, en 2011, oí en la radio de mi coche la oración del Rosario, que ni la conocía, y fue como una “espada de Amor” que me traspasó el corazón. Decidí ir unos días a Lourdes. Un año después, en 2012 volví de nuevo a Lourdes. Y fui a rezar el Rosario ante la Gruta de la Virgen María. Cuando acabé de rezarlo, de repente me caí al suelo y sentía que mis piernas estaban paralizadas y eso que yo siempre he sido muy deportista. La gente me levantó pasado un rato y en ese momento comprendí el Amor y el Poder de Dios. Un tiempo después fui a pasar una semana de retiro a una abadía. Y entonces mi fe se desarrolló totalmente. Volví a misa cada día. Me puse a rezar cada mañana y cada tarde. Entonces comprendí que la masonería no era compatible con la fe. Lo averigüé por mi mismo.

-¿Por qué odian las logias masónicas al catolicismo?

-Porque por supuesto la ideología de la masonería es totalmente antagónica y contraria a la Palabra de Dios. Esto no quiere decir que los católicos no puedan hablar con los masones. Nosotros, católicos, tenemos que hablar con todos los hombres. Y por supuesto con los masones. Pero tenemos que decirles lo que es verdaderamente la Iglesia y la Palabra de Dios, porque desde hace siglos la masonería no para de denigrar a la Iglesia. Y la masonería engaña a las personas para hacerlas ingresar en sus logias. El sueño de la masonería sería robar a los católicos de las iglesias para acogerlos en las logias.

-¿Cuál es el verdadero poder la masonería en la política y la economía mundial? 

-Hay que fijarse en que en todo el mundo se están promulgando leyes muy similares: aborto, divorcio, matrimonio homosexual, eutanasia… Estas leyes son de origen masónico. Y es que escogen a profesores, funcionarios y políticos, es decir, personas que pueden influir en la sociedad y esto llega a todo el mundo. Por ello, nos acercamos cada día más, sin darnos cuenta, a la ideología masónica.





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Leer más aquí: www.religionenlibertad.com


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XRCO5HA-o4U

Victimhood culture makes for worse citizens — people who are less helpful, more entitled, and more selfish

The real victims of victimhoodby Arthur C. Brooks

The line is fuzzy between fighting for victimized people and promoting a victimhood culture

Back in 1993, the misanthropic art critic Robert Hughes published a grumpy, entertaining book called “Culture of Complaint,” (1) in which he predicted that America was doomed to become increasingly an “infantilized culture” of victimhood. It was a rant against what he saw as a grievance industry appearing all across the political spectrum.

I enjoyed the book, but as a lifelong optimist about America, was unpersuaded by Mr. Hughes’s argument. I dismissed it as just another apocalyptic prediction about our culture.

Unfortunately, the intervening two decades have made Mr. Hughes look prophetic and me look naïve.

“Victimhood culture” has now been identified as a widening phenomenon by mainstream sociologists. And it is impossible to miss the obvious examples all around us. We can laugh off some of them, for example, the argument that the design of a Starbucks cup is evidence of a secularist war on Christmas. Others, however, are more ominous.

On campuses, activists interpret ordinary interactions as “microaggressions” and set up “safe spaces” to protect students from certain forms of speech. And presidential candidates on both the left and the right routinely motivate supporters by declaring that they are under attack by immigrants or wealthy people.

So who cares if we are becoming a culture of victimhood? We all should. To begin with, victimhood makes it more and more difficult for us to resolve political and social conflicts. The culture feeds a mentality that crowds out a necessary give and take — the very concept of good-faith disagreement — turning every policy difference into a pitched battle between good (us) and evil (them).

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Read more: www.aei.org


(1) The best-selling author of The Shock of the New, The Fatal Shore, and Barcelona here delivers a withering polemic aimed at the heart of recent American politics and culture.

Culture of Complaint is a call for the re-knitting of a fragmented and over-tribalized America--a deeply passionate book, filled with barbed wit and devastating takes on public life, both left and right of center. To the right, Hughes fires broadsides at the populist demagogy of Pat Buchanan, Pat Robertson, Jesse Helms and especially Ronald Reagan ("with somnambulistic efficiency, Reagan educated America down to his level. He left his country a little stupider in 1988 than it had been in 1980, and a lot more tolerant of lies"). To the left, he skewers political correctness ("political etiquette, not politics itself"), Afrocentrism, and academic obsessions with theory ("The world changes more deeply, widely, thrillingly than at any moment since 1917, perhaps since 1848, and the American academic left keeps fretting about how phallocentricity is inscribed in Dickens' portrayal of Little Nell"). PC censoriousness and "family-values" rhetoric, he argues, are only two sides of the same character, extrusions of America's puritan heritage into the present--and, at root, signs of America's difficulty in seeing past the end of the Us-versus-Them mentality implanted by four decades of the Cold War.

In the long retreat from public responsibility beaten by America in the 80s, Hughes sees "a hollowness at the cultural core"--a nation "obsessed with therapies and filled with distrust of formal politics; skeptical of authority and prey to superstition; its language corroded by fake pity and euphemism." It resembles "late Rome...in the corruption and verbosity of its senators, in its reliance on sacred geese (those feathered ancestors of our own pollsters and spin-doctors) and in its submission to senile, deified emperors controlled by astrologers and extravagant wives."

Culture of Complaint is fired by a deep concern for the way Hughes sees his adopted country heading. But it is not a relentless diatribe. If Hughes lambastes some aspects of American politics, he applauds Vaclav Havel's vision of politics "not as the art of the useful, but politics as practical morality, as service to the truth." And if he denounces PC, he offers a brilliant and heartfelt defence of non-ideological multiculturalism as an antidote to Americans' difficulty in imagining the rest of the world--and other Americans.
Here, then, is an extraordinary cri de coeur, an outspoken call for the reconstruction of America's ideas about its recent self. It is a book that everyone interested in American culture will want to read

Touchstone January/February 2016 . (From the new issue)

The Vanishing Point of Marriage

How the Minimalist Redefinition Erodes a Foundational Institution 

by Andrew J. Peach

Surprising no one, the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodgesstruck down all state laws (including state constitutional amendments) upholding the definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman, and recognized as "marriage" (and conferred legal legitimacy upon) unions between persons of the same sex. Seeing past the illusions of every generation prior to its own, the Court proclaimed, . . .


Bargain Debasement

Secular Credibility Is a Devilish Temptation

by James Hitchcock

The familiar phrase "worldly wisdom" is in contrast to true wisdom, which is a wholly good quality. The story of the unjust steward is considered the most difficult of all Jesus' parables, in that it seems to recommend calculating worldly wisdom. Thus, recent biblical translations have changed "wise" to "shrewd," a change that clearly seems warranted by the context. . . .



Higher-Order Marriage

Progressive Myths & Christianity's Deeper Revolution

by David J. Theroux

Marriage is a universal institution of civilization. We find no human society in which marriage has not existed in some form, and virtually all marriage ceremonies historically have involved religious elements. Yet for many years now, natural ("traditional") marriage and the family have become the subjects of secular ridicule, with the family increasingly politicized and socialized by "progressive" government bureaucracies. As Charles Murray has shown in his books . . .



Family-Oriented

How the State of Marriage Looks from China & Within China

by David Marshall 

As happy as I am to have spent much of the Obama administration in China, my relief only grew this past spring, during the run-up to the Supreme Court's Obergefelldecision on so-called same-sex marriage, and during the weeks of endless commentary and celebration following it. But distance may also lend a certain perspective to the ongoing train-wreck. In any case, as I climbed a hill in southern China one Sunday, . . .


Subscribers can read the entire issue online by logging in to Touchstone digital. Touchstone is also available for yourKindle.

Now that the crisis is seven years behind us, how have governments and voters in Europe and North America answered this important question?

The political aftermath of financial crises: Going to extremes

Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick, Christoph Trebesch 


Recent events in Europe provide ample evidence that the political aftershocks of financial crises can be severe. This column uses a new dataset that covers elections and crises in 20 advanced economies going back to 1870 to systematically study the political aftermath of financial crises. Far-right parties are the biggest beneficiaries of financial crises, while the fractionalisation of parliaments complicates post-crisis governance. These effects are not observed following normal recessions or severe non-financial macroeconomic shocks.

The Crisis has dealt a severe blow to Europe’s political system. Rushing from one emergency summit to the next, crisis fighting has become the new normal for Europe’s political class. At the national level too, two-party systems that were stable for decades have been swept away in recent years, with new parties seeing landslide victories in elections. Mass demonstrations, strikes and political turmoil make daily headlines.

With the catastrophe of the 1930s in mind, the fear of ongoing political radicalisation in the wake of economic and financial disasters looms large in the public discourse. What does history have to say about the political after-effects of financial crises in modern democracies? Can we, over the long run of modern history, identify systematic shifts in the political landscape after financial crises?

We are not the first to ask such questions. De Bromhead et al (2012) show how the Great Depression in the 1930s triggered political extremism. Using more recent data, Grüner and Brückner (2010) find that low growth is associated with more extremist voting, while Mian et al (2012) find that financial crises are followed by fractionalisation and polarisation of parliaments. Related, Bloom et al (2011) demonstrate that policy uncertainty is particularly high after financial crises.

In a new paper (Funke et al 2015), we conduct the most comprehensive historical analysis on the political fall-out of financial crises to date. We trace the political history of 20 advanced democracies back to the 1870s and construct a dataset of more than 800 elections from 1870 to 2014. We then complement this dataset with existing data on more than 100 financial crises and with historical data on street protests (demonstrations, riots, and strikes).

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Read more: www.voxeu.org

Related

• The price of political uncertainty - Bryan T. Kelly, Lubos Pastor, Pietro Veronesi
• Banking crises and political survival over the long run - Jeffrey Chwieroth, Andrew Walter
• Political constraints in the aftermath of financial crises - Francesco Trebbi, Atif Mian, Amir Sufi
• Why the global financial crisis has been wasted - Nauro F. Campos, Jeffrey B Nugent
• After the crisis is before the crisis: The political economy of debt relief - Andreas Freytag, Gernot Pehnelt

The Muslim share of the UK population is bound to grow for decades to come

European Politics With an Islamic Face?
by Robert Skidelsky, Professor Emeritus of Political Economy and a fellow of the British Academy in history and economics, is a member of the British House of Lords.

Donald Trump’s call to bar Muslims from the United States provoked the following exchange with two young friends of mine: “If the choice was between Muslim immigration and preserving liberal moral values,” I asked, “which would you choose?” They both denied the question’s premise. The immigrants themselves, they suggested, might have reactionary moral codes, but their children, growing up in today’s Britain, America, or Continental Europe, would be quite different. But is that true?

My question focused not on Islamist terrorism – the ostensible ground of Trump’s outburst – but on the threat posed by large-scale Muslim immigration to the code of morals that my young friends, like most educated Europeans, now accept without question. Terrorism aside, wouldn’t they worry if Islam came to have a growing influence on British law and politics?

This is not just a hypothetical possibility. The Muslim population in Europe was 44.1 million in 2010, or 6% of the total. There were 2.7 million Muslims in the United Kingdom in 2011 (4.8% of the population), up from 1.6 million in 2001. Given recent immigration trends and, more important, Muslims’ above-average fertility rate (three children per family versus the British average of 1.8), the Muslim share of the UK population is bound to grow for decades to come.

Much of Europe is on the same demographic trajectory. Of course, demographics is not an exact science: Much depends on assumptions about age profiles, standards of living, inequality, and so on, and sooner or later the Muslim fertility rate will converge with the national average. But by then the Muslim population will have expanded rapidly – to 10-20% of the total in the UK. The interesting question concerns the consequences of this.

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Read more at: www.project-syndicate.org

Institutional factors contributing to the strong international differences in life satisfaction

Life satisfaction gap between transition countries and the West is closing

by IZA Press

Trends of globalization such as migration, economic integration and digital communication are undoubtedly bringing people closer together. But do they also cause the levels of satisfaction to converge? Researchers have long studied the institutional factors contributing to the strong international differences in life satisfaction.

The transition of the Central and Eastern European states after the collapse of the Soviet Union provides a particularly rewarding object of investigation in this respect. It entailed a series of socioeconomic, political and institutional transitions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Unemployment, inequality, income volatility, and, in some cases, civil war accompanied the more positive experiences of obtaining new political rights and civil liberties.

In addition to far-reaching economic reforms to establish market economies, these transition countries had to create the legal and institutional foundations that underpin modern democratic and capitalist nations. This involved fundamentally reforming old institutions or creating new modern institutions of public finance, central banking, and customs.

Life and unhappiness in transition

Many papers have tried to uncover the factors behind the declining life satisfaction levels during the transition and have concluded that rising unemployment, inequality and uncertainty, income volatility, rapidly changing social norms, and declining social protection are some viable explanations (see for example IZA DP 3409 and this 2009 article about the (un)happiness in transition).

However, despite their dramatic declines in the early 1990s, income and consumption improved substantially by the late 1990s, suggesting that the transition was a successful process. Yet, alongside these improvements, subjective well-being indicators show a more nuanced story. During the 1990s, mirroring the income trends, life satisfaction in transition countries sharply declined, and while it started to recover in the 1990s, it failed to match the recovery in GDP.

What can close the life satisfaction gap?

Despite the large literature that examines the transitioning process, few studies look at the life satisfaction differentials between transition and non-transition economies. In a new IZA Discussion Paper, Milena Nikolova studies the life satisfaction gap between post-socialist and advanced Western societies and the role of the rule of law in explaining this gap.

As the transition process entails reaching the quality of life levels in developed countries, advanced countries are the relevant comparison group. Because the rule of law is related to democratic institutions and the market economy, it is particularly relevant for transition economies, where such reforms were most pronounced in the 1990s.

Using World Values Survey data for 1994-2013, Nikolova shows that the average life satisfaction between advanced and transition countries has started to converge in recent years. In a regression framework, she demonstrates that the life satisfaction differential persisted until the early 2000s but had closed during the 2010-2013 period (see figure).

Note: The figure represents the predictive margins of life satisfaction by survey wave for transition and advanced countries (conditional marginal effects) with 95 percent confidence intervals.
(Source: IZA DP No. 9484)

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Download the complete paper (IZA DP No. 9484):
Minding the Happiness Gap: Political Institutions and Perceived Quality of Life in Transition


Read more: www.capx.co

2015 has been an incredible year for the progression in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights across the globe.

The 23 most powerful LGBT executives in the world in 2015

by Lianna Brinded


2015 has been an incredible year for the progression in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights across the globe.

The US Supreme Court legalised same-sex marriage is all 50 states of America in June this year while Caitlyn Jenner gave more prominence to the LGBT community with her reveal.

And in the business world, OUTstanding, the LGBT networking group, unveiled the most powerful LGBT executives in the world. (https://www.out-standing.org/top100)

OUTstanding lists 100 people who it thinks challenges the presumption that you can't be openly LGBT and be successful in business. In conjunction with the Financial Times, it makes the list each year.

"Those featured are an inspiration to anyone who fears that they may have to be closeted at work, and waste valuable effort muting their authentic selves," said Suki Sandhu, chief executive of OUTstanding.

However, notably Apple's CEO Tim Cook was missing. OUTstanding said that it was forced to omit him because it was unable to gain permission for him to be included in the list.


23. Brian Bickell, Chief Executive of Shaftesbury.
22. Andrew Swaffield, CEO of the Monarch Airlines Group.
21. David Furnish, CEO of Rocket Entertainment Group.
20. Stephen Clarke, CEO at WH Smith.
19. Alex Schultz, VP, Growth at Facebook.
18. Paul Wood, Chief Risk & Compliance Officer at Bloomberg.
17. Trevor Burgess, President & CEO of C1 Financial.
16. Jan Gooding, Group Brand Director at Aviva.
15. Louis Vega, Chief of Staff, Global Director Office of the Chairman & CEO and Executive Communications and Vice President of Dow Olympics & Sports Solutions.
14. Jason Grenfell-Gardner, President and CEO at IGI Laboratories.
13. Arjan Dijk, Vice President of Marketing at Google.
12. Joseph Evangelisti, Chief Communications Officer for JP Morgan Chase.
11. Liz Bingham, most senior LGBT Partner in the UK & Ireland firm of EY.
10. Sander van ‘t Noordende, Group Chief Executive Products for Accenture.
9. Anthony Watson, President & Chief Executive Officer of Uphold.
8. Christopher Bailey, Chief Creative & Chief Executive Officer of Burberry.
7. Beth Brooke-Marciniak, Global Vice Chair of Public Policy for EY.
6. Paul Reed, CEO of the Integrated Supply and Trading division (IST) at BP.
5. Claudia Brind-Woody, Vice President and Managing Director at IBM
4. Martine Rothblatt, Co-CEO of the United Therapeutics Corporation.
3. Antonio Simoes, CEO of HSBC Bank.
2. Alan Joyce, CEO of Qantas.
1. Inga Beale, CEO of Lloyd's of London.

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Read more: www.businessinsider.com