by S. Adam Seagrave
As a philosopher, Locke was both historically great and uniquely ambivalent. This combination provides extraordinarily fertile ground for uniting modern and pre-modern insights that seem opposed.
At the close of my previous essay, I suggested that the moderns, despite their mistaken rejection of the objective contexts within which the individual exists, might have an important insight to contribute to our thinking about the non-religious foundations of morality: namely, that the individual as an individual contains one such foundation within himself, a foundation termed “natural rights” and explained most completely and persuasively by John Locke.
By recognizing this insight and effectively integrating it into a broader framework informed by sound pre-modern approaches, we can accomplish three important tasks.
Early in the Second Treatise, Locke unequivocally affirms what has become known as “the workmanship argument”: the idea that human beings are “His property, whose workmanship they are.” In other words, God owns us because he created us. A few chapters later, however, one of the most striking examples of Locke’s ambivalent modernism appears as he asserts that “every man has a property in his own person.” But how can man be simultaneously God’s property and his own? If property ownership includes the notion of exclusivity—as it seems to in both Locke’s and our understanding—wouldn’t God’s ownership exclude our ownership, and vice versa?
This central issue for understanding Locke’s political philosophy is also a perfect proxy for many of the profound disagreements between modern and pre-modern approaches to understanding human nature and their consequences for morality and politics. The idea that we are not simply our own—that we are answerable as human beings to normatively binding standards above and beyond ourselves—is a tidy way of encapsulating what is common among pre-modern moral and political philosophy, traditional religious beliefs, and much of modern conservatism. By contrast, the idea that we are our own persons—that we are each authorized to direct our actions as we ourselves see fit—encapsulates significant commonalities among modern moral and political philosophy, secularism, and social liberalism. The former views the individual human being as existing within an inescapable and rich objective context defined by the existence of an intelligent Creator-God as well as natural relationships and communities, while the latter views the individual human being in relative isolation and freedom from these broader contexts.
How, then, can Locke affirm both in the Second Treatise? As the Essay Concerning Human Understanding helps us to understand, Locke means simultaneously to view the human being in two different ways. First, man is a member of “mankind,” a participant in a “community of nature” whose common capacities, faculties, or potentialities have been determined and brought into being by a Creator. Second, he is a unique individual whose singular self-consciousness separates this individual from all other human beings. In terms of the first conception, God owns us. In terms of the second, we each own ourselves. The first serves as the foundation for Locke’s understanding of the natural law, while the second serves as the foundation for Locke’s natural rights.
Although it would be difficult to argue that Locke was himself any sort of Aristotelian-Thomist, his understanding of human beings in terms of their common humanity, as well as his definition of this common humanity primarily in terms of reason, indicates significant agreement between Locke and the pre-moderns. For pre-moderns of all stripes—be they Platonists, Aristotelians, or Thomists—rationality was the defining human characteristic grounding natural morality. On this point, Locke is as clear and emphatic as could be.
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Read more: www.thepublicdiscourse.com
- First, we can build new bridges between the broad Maritainian and Straussian lines of conservative thought, uniting this historically divided opposition to the reigning modern secular liberalism.
- Second, we can smooth the sharp disjunction between the individualist/subjectivist perspective of modern secular liberalism and the communitarian/objectivist perspective of pre-modern and/or religious conservatism, enhancing the possibility of dialogue and persuasion in contemporary public discourse.
- Third and most importantly, we can reach a truer understanding of human nature as a foundation for morality.
A promising starting point for all of this lies in recovering a proper understanding of John Locke’s political philosophy. In an important sense, the modern Aristotelian-Thomist should also be a Lockean.
This is not to deny the significant departures from pre-modern philosophy that are clearly present in Locke’s thought. Locke was indeed a “modern,” but he, unlike most other moderns, was noticeably uneasy in his modernism.
This uneasiness led to a unique coexistence of modern and pre-modern principles within Locke’s political philosophy: secularism and Christianity, the individual and the community, subjectivism and objectivism, and natural rights and the natural law all play crucial roles in the Second Treatise.
As a philosopher, Locke was both historically great and uniquely ambivalent, a combination that provides extraordinarily fertile ground for uniting modern and pre-modern insights that generally seem opposed.
Early in the Second Treatise, Locke unequivocally affirms what has become known as “the workmanship argument”: the idea that human beings are “His property, whose workmanship they are.” In other words, God owns us because he created us. A few chapters later, however, one of the most striking examples of Locke’s ambivalent modernism appears as he asserts that “every man has a property in his own person.” But how can man be simultaneously God’s property and his own? If property ownership includes the notion of exclusivity—as it seems to in both Locke’s and our understanding—wouldn’t God’s ownership exclude our ownership, and vice versa?
This central issue for understanding Locke’s political philosophy is also a perfect proxy for many of the profound disagreements between modern and pre-modern approaches to understanding human nature and their consequences for morality and politics. The idea that we are not simply our own—that we are answerable as human beings to normatively binding standards above and beyond ourselves—is a tidy way of encapsulating what is common among pre-modern moral and political philosophy, traditional religious beliefs, and much of modern conservatism. By contrast, the idea that we are our own persons—that we are each authorized to direct our actions as we ourselves see fit—encapsulates significant commonalities among modern moral and political philosophy, secularism, and social liberalism. The former views the individual human being as existing within an inescapable and rich objective context defined by the existence of an intelligent Creator-God as well as natural relationships and communities, while the latter views the individual human being in relative isolation and freedom from these broader contexts.
How, then, can Locke affirm both in the Second Treatise? As the Essay Concerning Human Understanding helps us to understand, Locke means simultaneously to view the human being in two different ways. First, man is a member of “mankind,” a participant in a “community of nature” whose common capacities, faculties, or potentialities have been determined and brought into being by a Creator. Second, he is a unique individual whose singular self-consciousness separates this individual from all other human beings. In terms of the first conception, God owns us. In terms of the second, we each own ourselves. The first serves as the foundation for Locke’s understanding of the natural law, while the second serves as the foundation for Locke’s natural rights.
Although it would be difficult to argue that Locke was himself any sort of Aristotelian-Thomist, his understanding of human beings in terms of their common humanity, as well as his definition of this common humanity primarily in terms of reason, indicates significant agreement between Locke and the pre-moderns. For pre-moderns of all stripes—be they Platonists, Aristotelians, or Thomists—rationality was the defining human characteristic grounding natural morality. On this point, Locke is as clear and emphatic as could be.
..................
Read more: www.thepublicdiscourse.com
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