The metaphysical foundations of science.

Illusions of Unity? Mind, Value, and Nature

by William Carroll

Is it wrong to study the natural sciences using 

a metaphysical framework that sees unity in reality?

There have been few books in recent years that have created as much discussion, in the academic world at least, as Thomas Nagel's Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. Critics of the explanatory reach (or what they think is an over-reach) of evolutionary biology were pleased to find an ally--or one who they thought was an ally--in an eminent philosopher who, despite his own atheism, was willing to reject a reigning materialist and reductionist account of nature and human nature.

More than anything else, it was Nagel's challenge to and rejection of those philosophical principles that underpin so much of modern and contemporary reflection on nature that seemed to many to be especially troublesome. It is one thing to question particular conclusions in the natural sciences; it is quite another to argue against a priori assumptions about their content. Nagel thinks that, in principle--and this phrase is key--the contemporary natural sciences are incapable of providing an adequate description of nature and, especially, of human nature. Mental processes and judgments of value are real features of the universe, and yet they are inexplicable in the categories of the natural sciences, as these sciences exist today.

In mid-August, Nagel published a short summary, titled "'The Core' of Mind and Cosmos," in the Opinionator column of the New York Times. For those who embrace an exclusively materialist view of reality, categories such as mind, value, and subjective experiences are often nothing more than words we give to describe purely physical phenomena. Nagel will have none of this. As he says, "biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory."

Nagel thinks that we must discover, or perhaps re-discover, that there is an immanent order to nature, which needs to be part of any expanded science of nature. Mind, he says, "is not an inexplicable accident or a divine and anomalous gift but a basic aspect of nature that we will not understand until we transcend the built-in limits of scientific orthodoxy." Nagel calls for a teleological naturalism that can describe an inherent directionality in nature.

Now, another contribution to the debate has appeared in the Opinionator, from Philip Kitcher, the John Dewey Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. In his essay "Things Fall Apart," Kitcher challenges what he thinks is Nagel's core misconception: the commitment to "a complete metaphysical view" of reality.

This is no small disagreement, and Kitcher's analysis, if correct, goes to the heart of scientific and philosophical endeavors. For this reason we should examine what Kitcher calls the "illusion of unity" that Nagel mistakenly embraces.

.................

Read more:www.thepublicdiscourse.com